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4Summary
This empirical analysis of a microeconomic dataset for the year 1992 and 833 Dutch
industrial firms finds that innovativeness (i.e. the share of  “radically or completely new
products” in turnover) is related to the length of the product life cycle, R&D intensity and
technological opportunities at firm level. The Schumpeterian notion that entree barriers,
market power and market concentration are important for innovativeness is contested by
our findings as firm size, the concentration ratio, persistence of profit parameters, and entry
and exit rates turn out to be insignificant. On average, knowledge protection by patenting
reduces the firms’ innovation performance whereas market-induced knowledge protection
created by first mover advantages increases innovativeness at the firm level. Our
investigation supports the notion of modern innovation theory that co-operation between
suppliers, main producers and users improves firms’ innovation performance.
51 Introduction
Innovation and Schumpeter are almost synonymous in many economic discussions. Indeed,
ever since the introduction of the notion of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1942) this
particular vision of how, on the one hand, innovativeness and, on the other hand, market
structure (firm size and concentration) interact has dominated empirical research that seeks
to relate R&D expenditures to market power. Empirical evidence, however, for the
Schumpeterian hypothesis is scant, both at the level of firms and industries (Symeonides,
1996) and at the macroeconomic level (Van Bergeijk and Haffner, 1996).
One reason why empirical studies may have been unable to detect the Schumpeterian
notion of a positive correlation between innovativeness and market power may be that the
research design is concentrating on the input of the innovation process (i.e., R&D) rather
than the output of that process (i.e., the new products that arrive and survive on the
market). Another reason may be that most studies only investigate a single specific aspect
of market structure, whereas structure is an intrinsically complex and endogenous concept
with many dimensions. In this paper we will try to achieve a more comprehensive picture
of the forces that determine innovation, using insights of modern innovation theory.
Our interest in this topic derives from two perspectives:
· the lagging of Dutch innovativeness behind other European countries; and
· the area of tension between on the one hand competition policy (that aims at improving
the efficient and dynamic functioning of markets) and on the other hand technology
and industrial policy (that stimulates technological co-operation between firms and
research institutes).
Dutch innovativeness is lagging behind other European countries. Figure 1 compares the
proportion of sales in new product areas in the 12 countries as reported by the European
Community Innovation Survey  (Calvart et al, 1996). The figure shows a wide variation in
innovation performance among countries. Due to methodological complications and
because the CIS data contain some country specific biases (for France, Spain and Portugal)
in the way firms responded to the questionnaire, caution is recommended when
interpreting the results of international comparisons. Nevertheless, the innovation
performance of Dutch firms is among  the lowest; around 35% of sales in new products for
Dutch firms compared to around 60% in Germany (the average is 41%).
6Figure 1 - Proportion of Sales in New Product 
Areas by Country, 1992
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Our second motivation is the substantial change in the Dutch policy environment that now
features competition and deregulation, whereas the Netherlands used to be the ‘cartel
paradise of Europe’ (Asbeek-Brusse and Griffiths, 1995). Discussion of this structural
policy change focusses on the possible trade-off between, on the one hand, the stimulus
from more vigorous competition policy creating economic dynamism and, on the other
hand, the negative influence on “excess” or “monopoly” profits that are assumed to be the
major source for financing R&D and “thus” for innovation. At the same time Dutch
innovation policy aims at increasing innovativeness by stimulating technology co-operation
between firms and research institutes. Thus the research question that we address in this
paper is at the heart of Dutch economic policy as it deals with an important topic on the
interface of competition policy, innovation policy and economic growth.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly restates the literature on the
determinants of innovation. On the basis of this literature Section 3 develops a short hand
description (“core model”) of innovativeness (i.e. the share of ‘radically or completely new
7products’ in turnover) that is related to the length of the product life cycle, R&D intensity
and technological opportunities at branch level. Next we discuss extensions of this
“empirical core model” considering market structure variables (such as concentration,
entree- and exit-ratios) and performance indicators (such as persistence of profits
parameters) that operationalize important ingredients of the Schumpeterian analysis. Next
we add variables that reflect the possibility of  effective knowledge protection (patenting
and first mover advantages). Finally, we introduce some indicators referring to the impact
of inter-firm co-operation on innovativeness. So in a sense our model investigates the
Schumpeterian hypotheses as well as the hypothesis of modern innovation theory that
inter-firm co-operation improves the innovation performance of firms. Section 4 then
presents and discusses the empirical results  (an appendix discusses the data sources in
more detail). In the final section we discuss our findings in the light of recent market
developments.
2 The determinants of innovation
One of the central issues in the industrial organisation literature focuses on the link
between market structure and firms’ innovativeness. A common argument in this part of
the literature, mostly using the economic analysis of Schumpeter (1942) as a starting point,
is that a concentrated market structure and a large firm size may improve firms’
innovativeness and hence their competitiveness.  This view contradicts the classical
observation, based on  the “ideal” model of perfect competition  that monopoly power
results in static allocative inefficiency. Schumpeter did not explicitly  explain why large
enterprises should perform better as innovators, but his successors formulated several
hypotheses explaining why innovation would increase with firm size and market power (for
an overview, see: Cohen and Levin, 1989; Geroski, 1990; Symeonidis, 1996). According to
this literature large firms with market power have:
· superior access to external capital;
· a better ability to pool and spread risks and to gain monopoly profits;
· scale and scope economics in the production of innovations; and
· more possibilities to finance R&D from own profits and to appropriate the returns on
innovation.
Symeonidis (1996) surveys the empirical literature on the relationship between innovation,
market structure and firm size and found little evidence in support of the Schumpeterian
hypothesis:
8“The main characteristic of the empirical literature on innovation-market-structure
hypothesis is its inconclusiveness. However, three main results seem to have
emerged. First, there is  little evidence of a positive relationship between R&D
intensity and concentration in general, although there may be circumstances where
such a relationship exists. Second, there is even less evidence of a positive
relationship between innovative output and market structure. Third, industry
characteristics such as technological opportunity explain much more of the variance
in R&D intensity or innovation than market structure.“
In addition, Symeonidis (1996) points out serious limitations such as measurement
problems, econometric problems relating to the endogeneity of market structure and
methodological problems such as the use of concentration ratios as a proxy of market
power.
A fundamental shortcoming of this part of the literature on firms’ innovation performance
is that it focuses on the individual firm as a solo performer in innovation processes (the
Schumpeterian “heroic entrepeneur”). Indeed, innovations are strongly motivated by the
horizontal struggle between competitors, but vertical relations between suppliers, main
producers and users are also of great importance for the creation of innovations (Edquist,
1997). Following Schumpeter, innovations can be characterised as new combinations of
(existing) knowledge and competencies, originating from different actors in the value chain.
It has already for a long time been recognised in modern innovation theory that firms
almost never innovate in isolation. Close interaction and knowledge exchange with
customers, competitors and suppliers of machinery and inputs is needed to innovate. And
according to the insights of modern interactionistic innovation theories innovations cluster
in industries that have a variety of forward and backward economic and technological
linkages in the value chain (for a review, see: Debresson, 1996 and Edquist, 1997).
However, so far vertical relations have not been systematically analysed in innovation
theory and there is a lack of an adequate theoretical approach as well as little empirical
evidence that support the hypothesis of interdependence between economic linkages and
innovation performance (Roelandt, Gerbrands, Van Dalen and Van Sinderen, 1996).
One exception is the pioneering work of DeBresson (1996), who developed a stochastic
theory for the prediction of innovation performance (DeBresson, 1996). In his view
economic conditions do not determine innovations but only increase the probability that an
innovation occurs. The economic conditions act both as constraints and incentives that
make innovative activity more probable in one area than in another. Accordingly innovative
competition is not made by individual firms, but by networks (DeBresson and Amesse,
1991). In this line of reasoning firms do not compete on their own. Paradoxically, they
compete through co-operation, within a network of other firms. In this view the probability
of innovation strongly depends on the number and variety of supplier an users linkages
between firms and industries. A domestic producer has more incentives to innovate when it
serves a variety of user industries and when it uses inputs from a variety of domestic
supplier industries. The underlying rationale of this hypothesis is that the variety of
9information and competences by dense suppliers and users networks will produce more
possibilities to recombine factors. As all innovative outputs need new combinations, it
follows that innovative outputs would be more likely when the number of user and
producer linkages increase. Figure 2 illustrates this “interdependency hypothesis”, assuming
that the level of innovation performance increases more than proportionately with the
number of economic linkages. DeBresson and his associates found significant empirical
support for this hypothesis in such diverse countries as Italy, France and China.
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Figure 2 - The vertical interdependency hypothesis on innovation
Figure based on DeBresson and Amesse (1991)
To conclude, the literature suggests that there seems to be little empirical support for the
hypothesis that market power, a large firm size and market concentration will increase the
level of innovative activity. This implies that there may be no trade-off between static and
dynamic efficiency and between competition policy and innovation performance. Modern
innovation theory suggests  that a dense suppliers-users network and co-operation and
knowledge exchange between suppliers and users in a value chain (vertical
interdependency) improves the firms’ innovation performance. This implies that the
combination of a vigorous competition policy creating economic dynamism and at the
same time a technology policy that stimulates vertical co-operation between firms would
increase the probability of  innovative behaviour.
innovativeness
number of forward and backward linkages
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In the next section of this paper we will focus on this issue, analysing empirically the link
between innovative activity, market structure and inter-firm co-operation. Does the
suggested relationships between on the one hand the smooth functioning of markets and
vertical inter-firm co-operation and on the other hand the level of innovativeness hold for
the Netherlands?
3 The core model
The research strategy adopted in this paper is a two stage procedure consisting of, firstly,
developing a “core” model that explains actual innovativeness at the firm level on the basis
of conditional factors (R&D-intensity, the length of the product life cycle and technological
opportunities) and, secondly, adding to this “core” model a number of variables that reflect
market structure and/or market conduct and public innovation policy instruments.
The various indicators of innovative behaviour used in the literature can be characterised
by measuring either innovative inputs or outputs (Research & Development, patents,
number of significant innovations, share of new products in turnover). These measures
have both advantages and disadvantages (Cohen and Levin, 1989; Symeonides, 1996). The
problem with patent counts is that the “propensity to patent” strongly depends on industry
structure and market conditions. Moreover not all patents will finally result in successful
innovations. It has also been argued that the economic impact of radical and major
innovations is initially low (Symeonidis, 1996). Radical innovations subsequently undergo a
series of small and gradual improvements that finally result in a broad diffusion and
adoption of the new developed knowledge in a variety of new products. In our analysis we
would like to focus on this broad interpretation of innovativeness using “the proportion of
radical or completely new products in firm’s turnover” as a proxy. We have used the firm’s
research and development activities (measured by R&D-intensity, that is: full time
equivalents engaged in research and development as a share of total employment) as a
proxy for the innovative inputs. All in all, we expect that R&D-intensity correlates
positively with innovativeness.
One difficulty, however, in measuring the relationship between innovation performance
and market structure is that opportunities to innovate can structurally differ between
industries and sectors due to the specific market characteristics and the available
possibilities of actually using new technologies for product and process renewal.  In the
literature most studies have controlled for technological opportunity, appropriability
conditions, or both. The literature suggests that this kind of industry characteristics explain
more of the variance in innovation performance than market structure variables
(Symeonidis, 1996). To handle this issue we have used two different measures:
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· LIFECY: the length of the product life cycle at firm level, and
· TECHOP: technological opportunities at industry level (3 digit), by ranking the average
industries’ unit values  in low and high technological opportunities (De Graaf and
Noordman, 1995).
We expect a negative correlation between the length of the product life cycle and the level
of innovativeness as a long length of the product life cycle may reduce the incentive to
innovate in the short run. We expect a positive correlation between the technological
opportunity proxy at industry level and the firm’s innovativeness.
Subsequently, we have extended this core model  considering market structure and market
conduct variables . Having the Schumpeterian approach in mind, we focus on variables that
indicate the level of competition in a market. The intensity of competition is difficult to
measure with any precision. To get a more comprehensive picture of the different factors
that might determine the level of rivalry or market power we have used seven measures:
· SIZE: firm size (number of employees at firm level);
· PROFIT: the persistence of profits (at industry level, 3 digit). The estimated values of
PROFIT indicate how fast short run excess profits return to normal profits in the long
run. A high PROFIT level indicates a low level of rivalry;
· C4_90: the C4 concentration ratio (market share of the four largest companies in the
industry, 3-digit-level);
· ENTRY: the share of new entrants at industry level (3-digit);
· EXIT: the share of exiting firms at industry level (3-digit);
· PATENT: the possibility of effective knowledge protection by patenting (dummy-
variable); and
· TIME: the possibility of effective knowledge protection by first mover advantages.
Following the Schumpeterian line of reasoning we expect a positive correlation between on
the one hand SIZE, PROFIT, C4_90, EXIT, PATENT and TIME and on the other hand
innovativeness. Furthermore we a priori expect a negative correlation between
innovativeness and ENTRY.
Next to this we extended the model with vertical interdependency variables following the
interactionistic innovation theory. The theory suggests that co-operation between users and
suppliers in a network might improve the innovation performance of firms. We
operationalized this hypothesis by using two proxies:
· LINKS: the total number of forward and backward linkages at industry level (3 digit),
and
· COOP: the existence of co-operation with suppliers and users at firm level (dummy
variable).
We consider the first variable to indicate the variety of the network structure in the industry
in which a firm operates (following Roelandt, Den Hertog and Jacobs, 1997). The second
variable refers to the actual existence of co-operative agreements directed towards
13
innovation between a firm and his suppliers and users. We expect a positive correlation
between on the one hand LINKS and COOP and on the other hand the probability of
innovative behaviour.
Finally we extended the model with a policy variable (POLICY), referring to the use of one
of the Dutch policy measures, aiming at improving firms´ innovative behaviour by granting
a loan to research and development activities. This facility, called the “Technologisch
Ontwikkelingskrediet (TOK)” (Technological Development Credit) originated in the 1950s
and can be characterised as a “revolving fund” as firms have to reimburse the loan after
having successfully innovated. Naturally, we expect that TOK affects innovativeness in a
positive way.
4 Empirical results
Table 1 summarizes the results of our OLS regressions.
The estimations of the core model in column 1 show significant correlations consistent
with a priori theoretical expectations. Research & Development activities positively
contribute to innovativeness, and so do technological opportunities at the industry level.
Our estimations support the hypothesis that a long product life cycle discourages
innovative behaviour in the short run. The coefficients of the core model appear to be
rather stable (see specifications 2 to 10).
From the regressions market concentration, firm size and entry barriers do not appear to
contribute significantly to innovativeness. All market structure variables turn out significant
and signs often contradict with the Schumpeterian line of reasoning.
The estimates for knowledge protection parameters (PATENT and TIME) at first sight
contradict common sense. On average, knowledge protection by patenting appears to
decrease the firms´ innovativeness. This result, however, is consistent with the literature on
the impact of knowledge diffusion on innovativeness (OECD, 1996). Knowledge
protection by one firm simply hinders other firms to imitate and adopt the new knowledge.
On the other hand, market-induced types of knowledge protection, like first mover
advantages, stimulates the innovative behaviour of firms. In that case not only the first
innovating firm can benefit from running ahead of his competitors, but at the same time
this stimulates its competitors to improve their own innovation performance.
The findings offer empirical support for modern interactionistic innovation theories which
state that an extended network of users and suppliers as well as actually co-operating with
suppliers and users will increase innovativeness (Roelandt, Gerbrands, Van Dalen and Van
Sinderen, 1996, DeBresson, 1996). It is interesting to note that this is not the case for co-
operative agreements with other actors than users and suppliers. We did not find any
significant evidence that co-operating with public and private research institutes and
14
universities or using intermediate broker institutions (like the Dutch Innovation Centres)
significantly improve the innovation behaviour of firms.
                                                                                                 
Table 1 – Regression Results, firms in industry, 1992, OLS.
Dependent variable: share of radical or complete new products in turnover (INNO)
Restriction: RDI<100
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
RDI  0,83* 0,84* 1,02*  0,84*  0,82* 0,85* 0,79
Techop  3,11* 3,06* 3,08*  2,90*  3,24* 3,66* 3,37
Lifecy -0,15* -0,14* -0,14* -0,15* -0,15* -0,15* -0,14
Size_200 -1.11
Profit -7,10
C4_90 -0,02
Entry   0,01
Exit -0,10
Patent -2,43**
Time  3,33**
LinkS 0,02
Coop 4,10
Policy
Turnover
16
Const 12,7* 13,0* 15,2* 13,4* 13,2* 10,9* 9,80
R2adj 0,10 0,10 0,12 0,10 0,10 0,12 0,11
F-value 33,6* 25,4* 24,1* 24,6* 20,1* 21,9* 22,0
No. Obs. 873 873 701 870 867 835 871
Sources: Dutch Innovation Survey 1993 , EIM, CBS and CPB.  For more details see Appendix.
* p < .01   ** p < .05  *** p < .10
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Finally, the estimates for public innovation policy instruments suggest a significant positive
relationship between the TOK facility and innovativeness. Other policy measures (the
“PBTS” aiming at facilitating co-operation between firms, universities and research
institutes and participating the EC technology programmes) do not significantly improve
firms´ innovative behaviour.
To conclude, the final model (F = 15,5 ) shows that:
· research and development activities and technological opportunities at industry level
improves the innovation performance of firms;
· a long product life cycle discourages to innovate in the short run;
· market concentration, firm size and market power does not show any significant
correlation with innovativeness and thus we did not find support for the Schumpeterian
hypotheses;
· overall, effectively patenting discourages innovativeness and “first mover advantages”
encourages innovation performance. This implies that market-induced types of
knowledge protection benefits the first innovator and at the same time stimulates its
competitors to imitate and adopt the newly developed knowledge in their products;
· a dense user-supplier network as well as co-operating with users and suppliers when
innovating will increase firms´ innovativeness.
Obviously, our findings should be interpreted with caution as we have faced serious data
and measurement problems. Our model, while significant in what it explains, only accounts
for 12 per cent of the variance in innovation performance. First of all we could not account
for other variables that, according to the modern innovation theory, also might explain the
level of innovativeness. For instance, we have used the level of research and development
activities as the main and only input into the firm´s innovation process. Modern innovation
theory suggests that several other types of knowledge (and more in particular the
combination of a variety of knowledge inputs, like education and training, marketing and
design, organisational renewal) also contribute significantly to the firms´ level of
innovativeness. Moreover, in the Netherlands research and development activities are
highly concentrated within a few large companies. The five most R&D-intensive companies
in the Netherlands account for almost 50  per cent of the total R&D expenditures and
about 50 Dutch firms account for 90 per cent of the total private research and
development expenditures. In combination with the relative low level of innovativeness of
Dutch firms (see section 1) our data set contains a lot of different firms that combine low
levels of R&D with low shares of new products in their turnover. Besides, due to lack of
data, we had to leave firms operating in the service sectors and in the farming sector
outside our analysis (most of the variables in the extended model are missing for the service
sectors and the survey does not contain any firm in the agricultural sector).
Indeed, measuring the degree of rivalry in a market with any precision is very difficult. We
have used broad indicators and found no significant correlations. And we could not specify
more precisely  the various mechanisms that might explain the relationship between market
structure and innovativeness. This is a more general limitation that has also been recognised
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in the literature in this field. The fact that we have not found support for the
Schumpeterian hypothesis does not simply mean that we have found evidence for the
competing hypothesis that a smooth market functioning improves innovativeness.
However, the findings offer support for the “interdependency hypothesis” and in addition
suggest that market-induced forms of knowledge protection increase the propensity to
innovate.
5 Discussion
How can we interpret our findings in the light of recent market developments? Due to the
changing nature of competition, the competitiveness and innovativeness of firms is
increasingly dependent upon entering strategic alliances with other companies and
knowledge institutions which have complementary knowledge and technology (Oerlemans,
1996, and Reger, 1997). As a result of the increasing globalisation of world trade (Van
Bergeijk and Mensink, 1997) and the opening of sheltered markets, competition is getting a
more international dimension and is intensifying. A firm’s competitiveness is increasingly
dependent upon the ability to apply new knowledge and technology in products and
production processes. Companies have to adapt themselves to rapidly changing market
conditions or take the lead by innovating its products and production processes.
Technological developments are taking place at an ever higher speed and the rate of
specialisation is increasing (Yoshitimo, 1997). It is increasingly difficult for individual
companies to produce all the relevant knowledge in house and to translate new knowledge
into innovative products or production processes. To reduce risk, companies are
specialising around their core competencies. Consequently, for their success in the
innovation process, companies are becoming more dependent upon complementary
competences outside the own company. Innovation is not so much a sole activity of a
single company (like the “heroic Schumpeterian entrepreneur”); it requires an active search
process to tap new sources of knowledge and technology and to apply them to products
and production processes. This places great demands on the ability of companies to
organise new combinations of complementary competences in a flexible way (Vickery and
Wurzburg, 1996). By a more flexible organisation and integration of different links in the
production chain through entering strategic alliances, joint ventures and consortia,
companies are developing strategies to cope with the increasing dependency on their
environment. The synergy stemming from the combination of complementary and
dissimilar competences and the necessity to cope the dependency on the environment are
the driving forces behind the development of such co-operative relationships, which are
meant to increase the innovativeness and competitiveness of all participating parties.
Establishing such co-operative relationships makes it easier for companies to respond to
changing competitive relations and to the ever higher quality demands of their customers.
Products and services have to be dedicated to the individual needs of the customers. This
“customisation” is not only a trend in the market for capital goods but also, and to an
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increasing extent, in the market for consumer products and services. As a result, the
innovation process extends over the full production chain. Strategic formation of networks
aimed at innovation requires therefore a flexible integration of activities of different
companies in the full value chain.
In this way, rivalry between companies for the favour of the high demanding customers is
stimulating the formation of networks of innovative actors and an increase in the quality of
products, services and production processes in the whole production chain. This need for
integration of several parts of the production chain has the result that in many cases the
most innovative networks cross the traditional borders of companies and sectors. New
combinations of markets and technologies require new forms of division of labour, as is
exemplified by the developments in the mecha-tronic (1970s), the opti-tronic (1980s), the
bio-chemical industry and multi-media (1990s).
Our findings seems to reflect these market developments, challenging the traditional line of
reasoning in economic research that primarily analyses horizontal relations between
competing firms with similar activities and focuses on price competition, entry barriers and
the individual firm.  Due to changing market conditions, nowadays competition is not
about individual firms, but about networks of dissimilar firms in the same value chain. And
the firms’ competitiveness strongly depend on its capability to absorb and use new
knowledge and to participate in strategic production networks.
So, inter-firm co-operation and competition coincide. According to Enright (1995) the
appropriate question is not whether to compete or co-operate, but rather on what
dimensions to compete and on what dimensions to co-operate. This issue is at the very
heart of economic policy making as it deals with an important topic at the interface of
competition policy, innovation policy and economic growth. Our findings suggest that a
combination of a vigorous competition policy creating economic dynamism and at the
same time a technology policy that stimulates (vertical) co-operation between firms, can
increase the probability of  innovative behaviour.
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Appendix: Summary of database and descriptive statistics
The data set contains microeconomic data of 833 industrial firms in the Netherlands for
the year 1992. This data set consists of survey data gathered and kindly provided by the
Stichting voor Economisch Onderzoek (SEO), University of Amsterdam. We extended the
data set with some variables at the sectoral level (3 digit), using these indicators as a proxy
of industry characteristics.
(1) The variables
Dependent variable
INNO: This variable represents at firm level the proportion of radically changed or
completely new products in turnover (1992). Data source: SEO, Dutch
Innovation Survey, 1992.
Independend variables
“Core model”
RDI: This variable measures the R&D intensity, based on the volume of labour
years (full time equivalents). More precisely RDI is defined as the volume of
R&D activities within a company (in labour years, full time equivalents) as a
percentage of the total number of  personel (in full time equivalents). Data
source: SEO, Dutch Innovation Survey, 1992.
TECHOP: De Graaf and Noordman (1995) constructed 5-digit product groups, using
unit values as proxy for technological content. This classification is an
alternative for the OECD-classification of sectors on account of  R&D-
intensity. The CPB classification is used in this study to construct a 3-digit
0/1 dummy variable “TECHOP”. When a sector produces low-tech or
medium-low-tech products, the value is 0, otherwise the dummy has the
value 1.
LIFECY: This variable measures at firm level the length of the life cycle of the most
important products (in years) of the firm. Data source: SEO, Dutch
Innovation Survey, 1992.
Competition
Size_200: We constructed a 0/1 dummy variable to control for the employment at the
firm level in 1992 (in full time equivalents). Value 0 means less than 200
employees (FTE’s), value 1 means 200 employees (FTE’s) or more. Data
source: SEO, Dutch Innovation-Survey, 1993.
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PROFIT: Kleijweg and Nieuwenhuijsen (1995) estimated for the Dutch industry (3-
digit level) how fast excess profits, made in the short run, disappear in the
long run. When profits in a sector exceed the average profit level of all
industries together, excess profits are made. With the help of regression
analysis, whereby actual excess profits are confronted with excess profits in
the past, the relative speed in which profits adjust to the calculated industry
average is defined. A high value of the variable “PROFIT” means that
short term excess profits disappear relatively slowely. This indicates a low
level of rivalry. For an extensive description of the research method en
results, see  Kleijweg and Nieuwenhuijsen (1995).
C4_90: Employment in 1990 of the 4 most labour intensive companies in a sector
divided by the total employment in the 3-digit sector for that year. Data
source: CBS.
ENTRY: Percentage of new entrants in a sector at 3 digit level (“starters en overige
oprichtingen”) in 1992. Data source: Chamber of Commerce,
“Mutatiebalansgegevens 1992”.
EXIT: Percentage of exiting firms (“opheffingen en faillisementen”) in 1992 at 3
digit level. Data source: Chamber of Commerce, “Mutatiebalansgegevens
1992”.
PATENT: Trying to protect the competition advantage of innovations, firms have
different opportunities. One of them is patenting the innovation. In the
SEO survey, firms were asked to judge, on a scale from 1 to 5, how
effective this instrument is for protecting their competitive advantage. Based
on these results, we constructed a 0/1 dummy variable, whereby 0 means
“not important” and 1 means “important”.
TIME: To protect the competition advantage of innovations, firms can benefit of
“first mover advantages”. In the SEO survey, firms were asked to judge, on
a scale from 1 to 5, how important ‘the time benefit for the first innovator’
is for protecting their competitive advantage. Based on these results, we
constructed a 0/1 dummy variable, whereby 0 means “not important” and 1
means “important”.
Co-operation
LINKS: The variable LINKS represent the number of backward and forward
linkages of a sector with suppliers and users, based on 3-digit input-output-
tables. Source: CBS, National Accounts.
COOP: In the SEO survey, firms were asked whether they participated actively in
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1992 in R&D-projects with other organisations (like suppliers, customers,
universities, rival firms). Contracting R&D out, without active participation,
is not meant in this definition. Based on these results, we constructed a 0/1
dummy variable. To firms that do not actively participate in a R&D project
we assigned the value 0. Firms that co-operate with suppliers and  custumers
were marked with value 1. Firms actively involved in R&D projects in
another way were also marked with 0.
Other
POLICY: In the SEO Innovation survey firms where asked whether they were
credited in 1992 with Technical Development Credits (“Technologisch
Ontwikkelingskrediet”). We constructed a 0/1 dummy variable with value 0
when a firm is not credited with this kind of government support and value
1 when a firm received such a credit.
TURNOVER: Based on indexdata (1985=100) of total sales for the year 1992, we
constructed a 3-digit variabele representing the growth of turnover in the
1985-1992 period. Data Source: CBS, Maandstatistieken.
(2) Descriptive statistics
The models in this study have been tested, using OLS regression analysis. R&D-firms
(RDI=100) were excluded (3 cases). The analysis is based on a microeconomic dataset for
the year 1992, including 833 observations for each variable.
The following table represents the correlation coefficients (to measures the strength of the
association between two variables). The matrix contains the dependent variable and the
significant independent variables of table 1 (see section 4 of this paper).
                                                                                                 
Table A: Correlation matrix (Restrictions: RDI<100, SBI74>200 and SBI74<400)
INNO RDI TEC
HOP
LIFE
CY
SIZE PRO
FIT
C4_90 EN
TRY
EXIT
RDI 0,24
*
1
TECHOP 0,13
*
0,07
*
1
LIFECY -0,17
*
-0,09
*
-0,12
*
1
SIZE_200 -0,02 0,12
*
-0,08
*
0,04
***
1
PROFIT -0,07
**
0,08
*
-0,28
*
0,01 0,11
*
1
C4_90 0,04
***
0,22
*
-0,08
*
0,01 0,18
*
0,32
*
1
ENTRY 0,02 0,06
*
0,06
*
-0.03 0,03
***
0,22
*
0,03 1
EXIT 0,00 -0,00 0,04
**
-0,06
**
0,00 0,15
*
-0,00 0,80
*
1
PATENT -0,00 0,18
*
0,08
*
-0,00 0,11
*
-0,02 0,03 0,03 -0,03
TIME 0,09 0,10 -0,02 -0,06 0,09 0,02 0,02 -0,03 -0,03
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* * ** *
LINKS 0,04
***
0,02 -0,16
*
-0,08
*
0,01 0,14
*
-0,15
*
0,08
*
0,03
COOP 0,11
*
0,12
*
-0,03 -0,06
**
0,18
*
0,03 0,06
**
-0,01 -0,02
POLICY 0,10
*
0,21
*
0,06
*
-0,03 0,07
*
-0,02 0,06
*
-0,01 0,01
TURN
OVER
-0,04
***
-0,05
*
0,20
*
0,00 -0,09
*
-0,08
*
-0,40
*
-0,06
*
-0,01
*    : P<0.01 (1-tailed significance), **  : P<0.05 (1-tailed significance), *** : P<0.10 (1-tailed significance)
